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In Apraxia (2013) Goldenberg combines a very reach clinical experience, reflected in 
many interesting observations and treatment of apraxic patients, with a unique 
scholarly knowledge of the classical studies on apraxia as it can be appreciated in the 
first three chapters but also throughout the book. This combination allowed him to 
cover a lot of what we wish to know about high-level motor deficits. In my 
commentary, however, I will focus on Goldenberg’s explanations of what goes wrong 
in limb apraxia as assessed by asking patients to imitate meaningless gestures and to 
use objects and tools. Indeed, in their present formulation, these accounts are still 
susceptible to some further discussion. 
Imitation 
A neurologist by training, Goldenberg opened up very soon in his career to a 
cognitive view of apraxia and adapted it to his own taste. Let us first consider action 
imitation (chapter 6). The impairment at imitating gestures, a key symptom of 
ideomotor apraxia, was hypothesized to be caused by a damage either to a vision-to-
action conversion mechanism (also called sub-lexical route), necessary for imitating 
novel, meaningless gestures, or to a lexical-semantic mechanism applicable to the 
imitation of gestures already known to the patient (see the model of action production 
by Rothi, Ochipa and Heilman, 1991). Goldenberg and Hagmann (1997) described 
two patients who were worse at imitating meaningless than meaningful gestures as 
well as at reproducing them on a manikin. The authors argued that the damage that 
caused this pathological performance was caused not only by a faulty vision-to-action 
conversion mechanism, as originally hypothesized by Rothi et al. (1990), but also to 
an impaired body structural description that codes the spatial relations between body 
parts and subserves the reproduction of one’s own gestures as well as of the body 
postures on the manikin (see also chapter 7). This selective deficit at imitating 
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meaningless gestures and reproducing them on a manikin has been observed at least 
in another patient (Peigneux, Van der Linden, Andres-Benito et al., 2000). The 
possible interaction between action imitation and a supramodal representation of the 
body has been acknowledged also by other authors (Buxbaum, Giovannetti and 
Libon, 2000; Buxbaum, 2001; Schwoebel, Buxbaum and Coslett, 2004), to date there 
is no general agreement as to whether the body representation engaged during action 
imitation is indeed is the body structural description, as suggested by Goldenberg, or 
as suggested by Buxbaum, Coslett and colleagues, the body image, that is a dynamic 
representation  that codes the position of body parts in movement (see Rumiati, 
Carmo and Corradi-Dell’Acqua 2009, for a discussion on this issue). What needs to 
be clarified is whether the presence of damage to either body representation is 
necessary for an apraxic deficit in gesture imitation to occur or whether it can simply 
co-occur.  
Tool use 
Goldenberg extensively studied ideational apraxia defined here as the patients’ 
reduced ability to use common objects and tools. Where does the functional 
breakdown lies in patients who fail to use objects correctly? He argues that it depends 
on the kind of knowledge that is destroyed by brain damage. First, the functional 
knowledge about objects and tools associates them to different important aspects of 
their use, including their purpose, recipient and typical action. A loss of this 
knowledge affects only the use of objects and tools that already belong to patients’ 
repertoire. On the other hand, individuals are also endowed with manipulation 
knowledge that, in Goldenberg’s view, coincides with a mechanical problem solving 
ability, a generative system that specifies the functional properties of an object’s 
parts. As such, this ability allows us to use novel objects, as specific functional 
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properties can be derived from the objects’ perceptual structure. Recently Goldenberg 
and Spatt (2009) showed that lesions in five patients with a defective retrieval of 
functional knowledge, but intact problem solving lesions, overlapped in the temporal 
cortex, while in five patients with the reverse pattern they overlapped in the parietal 
cortex. However, patients who failed on both tasks had problems with the use of 
common tools like hammer or scissors (see also Goldenberg & Hagmann, 1998). 
Goldenberg concludes that in order to efficiently use tools it is necessary that either 
functional knowledge or mechanical problem solving is intact (pp. 134-135), but that 
damage to the latter disrupts tool use more than the former.  
This conclusion is partially in contrast with the neuropsychological evidence 
that degraded functional knowledge does not prevent patients from using tools 
appropriately (see Negri, Lunardelli, Gigli and Rumiati, 2007; Silveri and Ciccarelli, 
2009). We argued that the errors that apraxic patients typically commit when using 
common tools and objects in everyday activities occur at the level of action selection 
and not from a loss of functional semantic knowledge (Rumiati, Zanini, Vorano and 
Shallice, 2001). In addition, when Cooper (2007) applied a computation model 
previously developed (Cooper and Shallice, 2000) to five standard multiple object 
tasks, he obtained error patterns similar to those committed by the two ideational 
apraxic patients studied by Rumiati et al. (2001). More specifically, tool use errors 
were found to arise from a generalised disturbance of object representations in 
triggering action representations (or schemas). 
Errors, especially omissions, committed in performing naturalistic actions as 
those employed in our study (Rumiati et al., 2001), have been argued not to be caused 
by a selective damage to a particular mechanism or subsystem necessary for using 
tools (see Schwartz, Lee, Coslett et al., 1998; Humphreys and Forde, 1998; Forde, 
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Humphreys and Remoundou, 2004; and see Goldenberg, 2013, chapter 9). In this 
view, the cause of errors is not deficit-based but it is due to the resource limitation 
(see Goldenberg, 2013, chapter 9, p. 141). I do not share this view and I argue that 
errors that relate to both the sequential organisation of an action as well as the misuse 
of the appropriate tools are qualitatively the same whether the object use is tested with 
objects in isolation or in a naturalistic action (De Renzi and Lucchelli, 1988; Rumiati 
et al., 2001). I do not discard the possibility that a diminished top down attentional 
control may account for some of the errors observed in patients performing 
naturalistic actions, as also demonstrated by the simulation study of Cooper and 
Shallice (2000), but I would maintain that the deficit affecting the tool use in left-
brain damaged patients can be pin down on a faulty mechanism in selecting actions 
from object representation (Cooper, 2007). 
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